What to include (and leave out) in Board financials

Many a post has been written about rules of thumb for holding effective Board meetings.  People should be present, meaning actually focused on the meeting and not doing other work (this one from Brad Feld at Foundry).   There should be an Executive Session scheduled with plenty of time for it (this one via Fred Wilson of USV).  I’m going to focus in particular how presenting financials can be done in order to maximize value and keep things focused on what is really important.
First of all, whatever you present as the CFO, it needs to be distributed ahead of time, preferably at least 72 hours.  This is one hard and fast rule that I try not to violate whenever possible.  There is nothing worse as the CFO than numbers that go out the night before an 8am meeting.  It’s not just Board members that hate this.  It invites scrutiny and questions, and is a signal – I am big on signaling – that management doesn’t quite have its act together.
What should be in the package?  Here are the things I minimally include in businesses that have a meaningful monthly cadence – which most build stage companies do.  For some it’s weekly; an example is an app where week-over-week growth is a meaningful metric.
  • Last month’s P&L vs. original forecast, and YTD vs. forecast
  • Last month’s P&L vs. prior month – dollars view
  • Last month’s P&L vs. prior month – unit economics view (meaning, take your P&L, and divide everything by the unit that’s most important in your business.  Could be square feet, available days for appointments, hours sold, hats – you name it)
  • Meaningful YoY stats by product line, location, or some other way to give investors an idea of where growth is (or is not coming from)
  • Headcount summary – by department, where are we against plan?  For many startups, this is where cash either gets burned (hiring too fast) or revenue growth is thwarted (because you can’t find the right head of marketing and while this saves you money in the short run, it means you are not driving top line in the medium-term)
  • Rolling forecast vs. original projection – meaning, if I re-forecast the business for the rest of the year (which you should be doing on an almost constant basis), where am I going to end up
  • Cash projection
If you have these ready to go 3 days ahead of time in well-formatted slides with pithy color commentary, you’ll serve everyone well.  You might need to add a few more based the particular business that you’re in, but this should get everyone grounded in the results and communicate how things are going.  Investors will have the opportunity to look through the numbers and draw some initial conclusions, which will make the financials review section of the meeting much smoother.
Your goal as the CFO is to let the strategic discussion take center stage and let the numbers support that discussion.
Caveat: sometimes you will have Board members/observers who do not read numbers early no matter how early you provide them, and are going to ask nitpick questions about one obscure figure that you know is not vital to anything.  Take a deep breath and go with it.  It’s not constructive behavior, and with any luck, the other Board members will talk to this person offline about expectations.  Your role is to set them high, and keep them there.

Feature It

Generally speaking, as a CFO you have 2 types of bad news to deliver.  The first type is where there’s a blip that you should report, but you and the CEO are pretty convinced that it’s not worth a long navel-gazing session with your investors.  A simple example that falls into this category is higher than expected G&A spending because your law firm forgot to invoice you for 3 months and you didn’t remember to accrue for this.  So, yes, it makes the numbers look worse than they really are, but if you can present the numbers in a way that doesn’t highlight this in bold underlines, that’s probably all for the best.
The other type of bad news is something that is impossible to hide.  Many CFOs are tempted to do this.  An example: new SaaS bookings are way behind even though the revenue curve for the current month or quarter is fine.  Quota deployed against bookings goals is way behind.  Hiring got away from you and you suddenly added 10 people when the budget called for 3.  You had projected cash lasting 18 months but now it sure looks more like 12.
If this happens, don’t hide it – feature it.
Meaning, present the financials as you normally do, but highlight the miss and make it front-page, bold-type, and unmissable.  Make the discussion about the bad news.  If you have conscientious investors who want to help you find solutions, they will.  In the closed-door executive session, they might have less-than-generous things to say about the company’s or management’s performance.  That’s fair.  Let them have that discussion instead of the one about why they had to uncover issues through forensic analysis because you tried to gloss over or hide it.
The same general rule of thumb goes for sharing numbers with your CEO.  Some bad news should be featured, early and often.

Bookings, cash and revenue

Frequently I find myself explaining accounting concepts to non-accountants.  It’s actually a part of what I do that I enjoy; I’ve taught courses as an adjunct in the past and the teaching was the fun part.  The rest of being an adjunct… well, the less said about that, the better.
One construct that seems to come up a lot, and can be confusing if you don’t spend all day thinking about this stuff like I do, is bookings vs revenue vs billings vs cash.
Bookings are closed orders.  Take the example of a subscription software business that sells a $10 per month service.  If you sell a 1 year subscription, that’s a $120 booking.  2 years, $240, and so on.  It is not revenue.
Revenue on this deal is $10 per month, recognized monthly, starting when the software was turned on for the customer.  Not when the deal is signed – when the service is turned on.  Similar concept in businesses that ship physical products.
This is different from cash.  You might get paid up front, in arrears, as you go, or 50/50 up front and at the end.  But when you collect the cash has no impact on revenue.  If you never collect the cash, this is bad debt expense (although if this happens a lot, you might need to adjust revenue).
I won’t get into the accounting debits and credits for all of these, but they can get complex quickly.  Imagine you have a subscription where the fee is $10 per month but you give away the first month for free.  The booking is $110, and the revenue is $9.17 per month over all 12 months.  From a revenue perspective, it’s the same as an 8.3333% discount.  Again, when you collect the cash for this is irrelevant.
This comes up a lot in membership based businesses where the first month can be free.  If there’s no term for the membership, then the revenue is just zero.  If there is a term, you recognize revenue ratably over the period.
The inverse of this is also true – if you sign a real estate lease with a rent-free period, your rent during the rent-free period isn’t zero.  For a 10 year lease with rent of $10 per month (just making the numbers easy), if you get the first six months free, your monthly rent expense is actually 10 * 114/120 = $9.50. The part you didn’t pay in cash for those 6 months gets carried on the balance sheet as an accrued liability. If you pay your rent late – which I don’t recommend – that doesn’t affect that rent is still an expense.  The total value of that lease is $1140 – it’s sort of the opposite of a booking from the company’s perspective.
Depending on your team, you too might find yourself explaining this frequently.  I have found certain board members in particular struggle to keep this straight.  It is the CFO’s job to make sure terms are clear and consistent, and as always, surprises are at a minimum.

Re-trading the job offer

In many of the companies I work with, I sign candidate offer letters.  This isn’t always something a CFO does, but if possible, I prefer that I (or the CEO) am the final check on this particular business process.  One obvious reason is that I know what’s in the budget for a given position.  One less obvious one is someone with a touch of OCD will find errors – incorrect years, language from an old template that doesn’t belong in this particular letter – that someone else might not.
Another reason is that recently for somewhat junior positions, I am seeing a lot of negotiating by candidates who have received a verbal offer, accepted it, and now wants to re-trade.  It’s hard for a hiring manager to resist this.  With rare exceptions, I always do.
A candidate who has accepted verbally a salary of $100, but then when they get the letter and ask for $105, is setting him or herself up for failure.  He’s now signaled that either (a) everything is going to be a negotiation, (b) I can’t necessarily trust him to keep commitments or (c) my offer is the stalking horse for another one.  In my experience, most often it is (c), but (a) and (b) do also come into play.
I have sales managers tell me that this is just someone who is valuable in the market negotiating hard for themselves.  I don’t see it that way.  Maybe I am biased because credibility is my only product.  In my view, once the parties agree, a negotiation is done.  If someone really is a superstar, we’re going to find that out and likely make an adjustment upward anyway.  Or if they have variable comp, they’re going to crush their numbers anyway so the base salary doesn’t really matter.  Needless to say, it’s nearly impossible to adjust down.
Because I work with build stage companies, the hiring managers often are young and haven’t had the scars yet of candidates re-trading their job offers because what they really want is more money to stay where they are. My advice is to resist.

Bcc:

As a CFO, I’m often included on cc:lists. Because I started my career in larger companies, I get why people cc: a lot of people on messages even though I try to limit this myself. And CFO’s often need to know when something is happening: a major contract negotiation, a sales discussion about an important customer, HR matters, you name it. It’s a core part of the job to be the second pair of eyes on something.

One thing I never do, however, is use bcc:

In my experience, it rarely does any good, and almost always causes issues. Example: someone who is bcc’d does a reflexive ‘reply all’ with a salty response instead of just to the person who bcc’d him. I once had a CEO who was bcc’d commit this sin and it was, to put it mildly, a problem.

This is why someone bcc’s me, I immediately ask them not to do it again. If they really want me to see something without having their recipient know it, then just forward it to me after the fact. This happens sometimes in sensitive situations where someone is on a performance plan and whoever put them there wants me to know. Even more reason not to do it via bcc:.

I mention this in a blog post about build stage companies because these tend to be populated by dreamers, which by extension means people who are young and inexperienced. You need some element of youth and inexperience to believe you can change the world. It’s not required but it helps.

So to those of you lucky enough to have these traits going for you, I’ll just say that this is an experiment I can save you the trouble from running. Just say no to bcc:.

Payroll

I had a TechCXO partner meeting last week.  I always learn a lot at these and this session was no exception.

One of my colleagues who is a long-time CFO told us about a rule he had in his companies about people who see payroll data.  Which is: you cannot get another job here that doesn’t involve payroll.  Once you see how much everyone makes, you either stay in that role, or you have to leave the company.

This seemed extreme when I first heard it.  But the more I consider it, the more sense it makes.

In truth, many build stage companies trust this extremely confidential information in the hands of office managers who double as the people who “do” HR, which includes running payroll.  Few of these people have bad intentions.  Many are inexperienced.  And not many things blow up culture faster than exposing this information in the wrong way.   Once that toothpaste is out, you cannot put it back in the tube, and it is very difficult to clean up.

So, today I plan to have a reminder conversation with everyone who works with me and handles payroll data.  Not because I don’t trust them – mostly because once you’ve seen this information a thousand times, you can lose sight of how sensitive it really is and how important it is to keep it confidential.

On a related note – another build-stage company payroll risk I frequently see is the “single press of a button” problem.  Meaning, one person can both enter payroll and submit it without an approval step.  I understand why this is tempting in the early stages, and yet: it is a really terrible idea.  (The same goes for bill pay and especially wires, by the way).

Systems like TriNet and ADP actually make it hard to do an approval step in their PEO implementations, which I don’t really understand.  That said – always put in a second pair of eyes on this.  That pair of eyes too is probably bound by the same rule that my partner puts in place: once you see payroll, you can never go back.

It’s strategic

A sentence that usually sets off alarm bells for CFO’s is “It’s strategic”.  This is usually code for a decision that seems to make no economic sense, but is so important to the business, the company “has to” do it anyway.  Examples of this include, but are not limited to (1) an acquisition that the numbers don’t really justify, (2) launching a new product line that’s not correlated with the current one, (3) geographic expansion to a far corner of the world, (4) overpaying for a certain employee, and (5) going all-in on a particular trade show exhibit or booth construction.

Mainly, I have 2 issues with this approach.

First of all, most things that management teams call “strategic” are actually tactical.  M&A is a tactic.  It should get you into a market segment, a geography, a product category, and be tied to a broader strategy.  In theory, your company will have done a build/buy/partner analysis against that strategy and decided that M&A is the tactic that best gets you there.  Even in build stage companies, where deals are often opportunistic buys of smaller or faltering competitors, it’s only a tactic.  If you’re chasing a deal because it’s “strategic”, something has gone awry already.

Second and maybe more importantly, a major decision that cannot be grounded in numbers of any kind is almost certainly going to go badly.  For example: an acquisition that is dilutive on its face should get to being accretive because it helps you raise prices, lower costs, increase sales volume, cut G&A, something that has an economic return.  This return should be based an assumption that an investor can see clearly and question, including seeing the sensitivity analysis around it.  After all, it is their capital or stock you are proposing to use.

If an acquisition does none of these ‘strategic’ things, and is still dilutive except with heroic assumptions, it doesn’t make sense.  Full stop.

Trade shows are trickier.  I shiver a bit when I hear that a particularly splashy trade show presence for a build-stage company is necessary because I know from experience that nine times out of 10, it leads to heartache and lost ROI.  I shiver even more when I hear that it’s for “brand building”.  Brand building is a very expensive game.  And, if we’re spending a lot to build our brand at a trade-show, I would advocate that this needs to be part of a broader strategy including customer service, how we package and deliver our products, fit and finish, you name it.  You can’t overspend at CES and make these other things go away.

As CFO, you have to keep your eye on what matters.  In my experience, something that is truly strategic will show up in the numbers.